Global economic transactions such as foreign direct investment ðFDIÞ must extend over an institutional abyss between the jurisdiction, and therefore protection, of the states involved. Intergovernmental organizations ðIGOsÞ represent an important attempt to span this abyss. The authors use a network approach to demonstrate that the connections between two countries, through joint membership in the same IGOs, are associated with a large positive influence on the FDI that flows between them. Moreover, they show that this effect occurs not only in the case of connections through economic IGOs but also through those with social and cultural mandates. This demonstrates that relational governance is important and feasible in the global context, even for the most risky transactions. The authors also examine the interdependence between the IGO network and the domestic institutions of states. Social and cultural IGO connections do more and economic IGO connections less to increase FDI when the target country is more democratic.
globalization. As with international interactions of all types, economic globalization presents intriguing questions regarding governance. Theories of the governance of economic transactions have been developed mostly in the domestic context. The state is always conspicuous in these theories, as the ultimate institutional authority within a country, and therefore is the backbone of the relevant institutional framework, even when private institutions are prominent in that framework. In stark contrast, there is no equivalent of the state to serve as the ultimate authority over international transactions. In terms of extant accounts of governance that depend on the state even if they do not focus on it, such transactions must cross an institutional abyss. We are careful to say an abyss and not a vacuum. While an important institutional mechanism-the legitimate coercive authority of the state-stops at the national boundary, there are other institutional mechanisms that may facilitate border-spanning activity. Our focus in this article is on these "institutions in between," and our core claim is that some of the most important of them operate via distinctly sociological mechanisms, namely, through relational governance.
A census of the bridges across the interstate institutional abyss would include culture, bilateral agreements, multinational corporations ðMNCsÞ, and networks. While the first two enter into our empirical analysis, the latter two are our theoretical focus. MNCs may subsume international economic transactions within their bureaucracies when they operate interdependent units in different countries. This phenomenon, called foreign direct investment ðFDIÞ, is the fastest-growing economic indicator of globalization, and it is the outcome that we seek to explain in this article. Between 1980 and 2009 the stock of FDI as a percentage of world gross domestic product ðGDPÞ increased by more than 300%, much faster than the trade to GDP ratio, which increased 11% over that period ðstatistics from the UN Conference on Trade and Development ½UNCTAD and the International Monetary Fund ½IMF World Economic Outlook databaseÞ. Our chief explanatory factor is the network of connections between countries through intergovernmental organizations ðthe IGO networkÞ, which are organizations of states that aim to facilitate international surety, coordination, and trust ðFligstein and Stone-Sweet 2002Þ. Additionally, we consider domestic political institutions that may provide credible commitments to MNCs and examine their interdependence with the IGO network.
Our focus on the IGO network continues a trend in sociological accounts of economic globalization that have increasingly emphasized the role of international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental.
World-polity theory has traditionally emphasized interstate power and dependence to explain the pattern of economic globalization ðVan Rossem 1996Þ, but Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer ð2000, p. 93Þ suggest that international organizations could substitute for hegemonic states to provide global order.
2 Recent developments in value-chain theory have sought to explain global economic governance as a function of transaction attributes and highlight the significance of "global regulations," which are often fostered by international organizations ðGereffi, Humphrey, and Our foundational prediction is that there will be more FDI between states that are more connected in the IGO network. At a superficial level, this prediction might seem obvious given that many IGOs have explicit mandates to promote economic globalization. There are, however, theoretical arguments to the contrary. A small set of relevant analyses includes evidence that World Trade Organization ðWTOÞ membership is associated with increased FDI inflows to a country ðBüthe and Milner 2008Þ and that IMF conditions are associated with decreased FDI inflows to a country ðJensen 2006Þ. More importantly, our focus is not on the rules of any particular IGO but on the IGO network as a basis for relational governance, and we will show that connections in the network have a substantial influence on FDI, even when prominent and powerful IGOs such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank are excluded.
As Torfason and Ingram ð2010Þ showed, the IGO network is the basis of normative influence between countries, where contact and collaboration through IGOs form the basis of awareness, trust, and sympathy. Those sentiments have been the focus of recent sociological accounts of FDI ðBandelj 2008Þ. Our view that the IGO network is a source of relational governance leads to two notable departures from previous analyses linking IGOs to FDI. First, our analysis is dyadic, and we consider IGO connections between the senders and targets of FDI, not only the IGO memberships of the target. Second, we consider the full set of IGOs, not only the IMF and the WTO, but the hundreds of other organizations that are less known. Unlike the IMF and WTO, these organizations are mostly weak relative to the states that are their members. If they were functioning as enforcers of rules, they would surely fail, but they are fully adequate for the role we see them playing, as contexts for affiliation and, as Karns and Mingst ð2004, p. 9Þ put it, "peer pressure."
The view that the IGO network supports the relational governance of FDI also yields two unique theoretical predictions. First, if IGOs are contexts for affiliation, then it is not only economic IGOs ðEIGOsÞ that should matter but also social and cultural IGOs ðSCIGOsÞ. Indeed, countries' connections through SCIGOs may be particularly likely to produce trust and sympathy between their citizens. Second, relational governance is specific to the members of a relationship. It matters who they are, not only how they are connected. This could be the basis of a range of arguments as to how the characteristics of senders and targets of FDI interact with the IGO connections between them. We examine one version of this argument: that IGO connections between two states do less to promote FDI when the target is more democratic. Democracy and the democratic division of powers may allow target country governments to credibly commit to MNCs to protect their investments and therefore may lessen the benefits from IGO connections, at least to the extent that those connections provide surety.
THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
How different is international economic exchange from its domestic equivalent? A telling result is Anderson and van Wincoop's ð2003Þ finding that national borders reduce trade between the United States and Canada by about 40% and among other industrialized countries by about 30%. By comparing the magnitude of border effects to those of distance in gravity models of trade, Helliwell ð2002Þ concludes that the effect of a border to discourage trade is equivalent to adding 10,000 miles of distance between the traders. This equivalency is all the more impressive in light of the fact that the effect of physical distance to discourage trade is substantial, more than would be expected merely from transportation costs.
The effect of borders to discourage trade derives from two sources. The first is that ðideallyÞ states provide institutions to facilitate economic exchange domestically, and these institutions do not operate across borders because of the limitations on any one state's jurisdiction. The relevant institutions may be roughly divided into those that provide surety and those that facilitate coordination. In the realm of surety, strong laws that enforce contracts, protect property rights, and otherwise reduce transaction costs at the domestic level enable exchange partners to credibly commit to future actions and reduce the risk of malfeasance ðNorth 1990Þ. And while private actors also provide surety for economic transactions, in doing so they typically depend on the background of formal institutions of the state, as when private bargaining over contract disputes takes place "in the shadow of the law" ðMacaulay 1963Þ or when organizations that make assurances, such as auditors, stock exchanges, and banks, rely on state regulation to facilitate their own credible commitments. As for state institutions that facilitate coordination, the most obviously relevant is the provision of a common currency, a critical ingredient for smoothing exchange ðRose 2001Þ. Likewise, almost all states support communications and travel within their borders and provide exchange-relevant standards ðe.g., for measurementÞ.
The second source of border effects is the distribution of social networks and norms. Normative governance may facilitate exchange in markets where formal institutions of the state are absent or insufficient. For example, DiMaggio and Louch ð1998Þ have shown that buyers in what might otherwise be "markets for lemons" ðe.g., used carsÞ are particularly likely to transact with relatives. And Clay ð1997Þ shows how coalitions of merchants employing social sanctions facilitated trade in early 19th-century California, when there was no state enforcement of contracts. Of course, social relations sometimes span national borders, but they are overwhelmingly more common within a country. Gravity model analyses of outcomes such as migration and telephone calls show that there is a massive border effect for social relations as well as economic ones ðRietveld and Janssen 1990; Helliwell 1998Þ.
Although the evidence of border effects in global exchange has developed through the analysis of trade, we expect that they are even more discouraging of FDI than of trade. FDI avoids some of the challenges of international economic transactions by subsuming them within the organizational structure of an MNC. This is particularly useful for transacting intangibles, such as knowledge or permission to use a valuable brand ðTeece 1986; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001Þ. In many cases, communication mechanisms and intellectual property rights are insufficient to allow such intangibles to be transferred across borders in any other way than by an MNC that extends its operations via FDI ðVernon 1971Þ. Even in the case of intangibles, however, some familiar border effects apply. In particular, the internal operations of an MNC cannot completely resolve coordination problems because even though the corporation may standardize within, its various national operations must, in some ways, integrate with their local environments.
There are also border effects that are unique to FDI, or worse in the case of FDI than trade. Foremost among these is the exposure of investments in and profits from a target country to some form of expropriation by the target country government. Such expropriations may range from the nationalization of a plant to a domestic legal change that makes it more difficult for an MNC to extract profits from a target country. Compared to trade, the exposure of FDI to expropriation is notable because investments are typically larger, and exposure is mainly to the target country government rather than to private companies that may be engaged in trade.
Culture is another barrier that is uniquely problematic for FDI. Cultural distance, the extent of differences between countries regarding important cultural values, has been argued to discourage international transactions because it inhibits communication and knowledge transfer ðKogut and Singh 1988; Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz 2011Þ. Further, FDI, unlike trade and some other international transactions, typically involves some transfer of persons. Employees of the MNC often relocate, even if temporarily, to the target country to set up operations, coordinate with the parent firm, facilitate the transfer of intangible and tangible assets between the parent firm and the FDI operation, and protect those assets. Thus, FDI between culturally distant countries represents an added cost of submerging employees in a national environment they may find confusing, stressful, or even hostile. At the least, this increases concrete costs to the MNC as a result of premium pay and turnover. At the most, firms may forgo altogether some profitable FDI opportunities because the prospect of "living there" is so unappealing to managers and other employees.
THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF THE IGO NETWORK
If border effects exist because the traditional bases of governance of transactions-states and networks-are more relevant within than between countries, a natural source of relief would be from institutional structures that are explicitly international. There is no more likely candidate than the IGO, an organization with three or more states as members. Prominent examples are the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank, but there are currently more than 300 IGOs operating in the world system. While the majority of IGOs receive little public attention, all of them work to promote collective international goals, and many of these are specifically aimed at smoothing global economic transactions like FDI.
The most heavy-handed FDI influence comes from IGOs such as the IMF and World Bank, which encourage neoliberal economic reforms. For example, Polillo and Guillén ð2005, p. 1775Þ quote a letter of intent from the Indonesian government to the IMF wherein the government reports amending the banking law to, among other things, "permit major improvements in . . . openness to FDI." Similarly, Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén ð2005Þ show that pressure from the IMF and the World Bank increased privatization and regulatory reform in telecommunications and electricity industries around the world, opening the door to increased FDI in these important sectors. While these studies expose a coercive element of some important IGOs to push neoliberal policy on dependent countries, these same organizations promote less controversial policies that may be more important for FDI. Exemplary in this regard is the IMF's sponsorship of convertible currency. Its members agree to "promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements" ðhttp://www.imf .org/external/about.htmÞ.
Some IGOs provide dispute resolution processes that may encourage MNCs to take the commitments of target governments as credible and thereby reduce the perception of risk associated with FDI. A sample of the IGOs that facilitate such credible commitment includes the African Reinsurance Corporation, the European Court of Justice, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Many other IGOs promote the recognition and protection of property rights, among them the European Patent Office, the International Patent Cooperation Union, and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Still others promote communication and standardization, including the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, a number of postal unions, railway congresses, aviation councils, information banks, and centers for statistics.
With so many IGOs aimed at reducing international transaction costs, we might expect that their effect on FDI would already be well documented, but instead IGOs receive almost no attention in surveys of the determinants of FDI ðe.g., Blonigen 2005Þ. This may be an oversight in a literature that has tended to view governance in terms of domestic institutions rather than international ones. There are also theoretical arguments that efforts to affect countries' political economies are so complex that IGO programs may reduce FDI even if they intend to increase it ðJensen 2006Þ. And then there is the long-standing realist critique that IGOs lack the real power to change the behavior of states. That argument has manifested itself most vividly in the literature on war, but the core realist precept that "institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers" ðMearsheimer 1995, p. 82Þ is relevant with regard to the surety that states must offer MNCs to attract investment. Few analyses examine the influence of IGO memberships and policies on FDI, and these have looked at only two particularly powerful IGOs ðBüthe and Milner ½2008 on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO and Shandra, Ross, and London ½2003, Jensen ½2006, and Bandelj ½2008 on the IMFÞ and generated mixed results.
Furthermore, until recently there was little consistent evidence that IGOs promote economic outcomes of any type. In response to this inconsistent evidence, almost all generated in monadic analyses, Ingram et al. ð2005Þ argued that IGO efficacy should be understood in relational terms. They used simultaneous joint membership in IGOs to create an affiliation network between states and showed that this network was powerful for predicting dyadic trade, a result confirmed by Zhou ð2010Þ. The relational view of IGO influence is aligned to the dyadic nature of FDI. Often, a given IGO is useful for promoting FDI between two countries only if both are part of the IGO and therefore are subject to its policies. This is obviously true in the case of IGOs that promote coordination. It is also likely in the case of IGOs that promote FDI-friendly reforms, which align the economic systems of rich members and poor ones.
Just as important, the relational view of IGO influence is consistent with the normative mechanisms through which IGOs operate. Most IGOs are minimalist organizations, and they have no power to coerce their statemembers to do anything. Instead, "IGOs provide a forum where different expectations and norms are brought to light and conflicts get resolved" ðTorfason and Ingram 2010, p. 357Þ. Ultimately, the enforcement mechanism of IGOs is the same as for social groups-to expel nonconforming members-a mechanism that is more powerful when the bonds between members are strong and multidimensional ðHomans 1950Þ. These arguments suggest that all IGOs, even the many weak ones, may contribute to relational governance ðCao 2009Þ. Consistent with these arguments, Rangan and Sengul ð2009Þ found that the financial performance of MNCs' foreign investments depends on the IGO connections between their home and host countries. At the level of dyadic FDI flows we expect the following: HYPOTHESIS 1.-FDI flows will be stronger between two countries when the connection between them in the IGO network is stronger.
SOCIAL/CULTURAL IGOS AND CULTURAL CONVERGENCE
While evidence for hypothesis 1 would support our claim that IGOs govern through relational mechanisms, some might still argue whether it evidences sociological mechanisms. Connections through the majority of IGOs that have economic mandates might be seen as representing a relational but utilitarian "shadow of the future," where countries protect each other's MNC investments in the interest of preserving future valuable economic exchange ðGibbons 1999Þ. There are, however, a substantial number of IGOs that exist to promote social and cultural contact between nations, such as the Asia-Europe Foundation, whose mission is "to foster contacts and intercultural dialogue among people from all walks of life in Asia and Europe" ðhttp://www.asef.orgÞ, or the Bureau International des Expositions, which promotes world fairs ðhttp://www.bie-paris.orgÞ. Many other SCIGOs facilitate cohesion between the peoples of two countries through the pursuit of shared goals, such as the eradication of disease and the improvement of human rights. Bonikowski ð2010Þ shows that the IGO connections between two countries lead to cultural convergence between them.
The effect of SCIGOs on FDI is also worth considering, particularly because cultural differences between nations are an important impediment to FDI. Cultural distance inhibits FDI ðKogut and Singh 1988Þ and increases the failure risk of foreign ventures ðZaheer 1995Þ. Berry, Guillén, and Zhou ð2010Þ show that a number of other dimensions of interna-tional distance-in terms of political, financial, administrative, and scientific systems, tourism and Internet use, and demographics-also discourage FDI. There are SCIGOs that promote convergence on all of these dimensions. SCIGOs may enable FDI to the extent that they succeed in closing any or all of these forms of distance and reducing the "foreignness" of other countries' corporations.
The possibility that SCIGOs and not only EIGOs increase FDI evokes the claim from sociology's theory of embeddedness that social relations between traders can be the basis of trust and therefore reduce transaction costs ðGranovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996Þ. Greif ð1989Þ provides historical evidence of the social governance of international business by documenting the role of kinship in trading relations in the 11th-century Mediterranean region. Contemporary analyses have shown that there is more trade between countries whose populations have more trust for each other ðGuiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004Þ and that bilateral connections through SCIGOs are associated with higher trade ðIngram et al. 2005Þ . And most directly, Bandelj ð2002, 2008Þ shows that FDI is more likely to flow to Central and Eastern European countries from investor countries that have stronger cultural ties to the target countries, as indicated by historical immigration. This evidence, combined with arguments that cultural differences are particularly deleterious for FDI, suggests that IGOs that promote social and cultural ends may also affect this important economic outcome. Therefore we expect the following:
HYPOTHESIS 2.-FDI flows will be higher between countries that are more strongly connected through SCIGOs, and not only through EIGOs.
IGOS AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: TARGET COUNTRY DEMOCRACY
The most salient risk of FDI is that the government of the target country will expropriate the profits from the investment, or even the investment itself ðLi 2006Þ. This can occur outright through nationalization or if the government changes policies regarding taxes, the repatriation of profits, or competition. These possibilities suggest that the efficacy of IGO connections to promote FDI may depend on domestic institutions in the target country. To put it simply, we suspect that IGOs will do more to promote FDI for target countries whose domestic governments are unable to make credible commitments to investing MNCs. In other words, we see IGO governance and domestic institutions as potential substitutes.
The risk to an MNC's investment in a target country is generally understood to be higher when the political institutions of the target are more autocratic, because democracies do a better job of ensuring that investments are secure ðOlson 1993Þ. Evidence from economic history supports the idea that absolute power reduces a sovereign's ability to make credible commitments to investors and that the democratic division of power increases that ability ðNorth and Weingast 1989Þ. Li ð2006Þ reports that of 564 expropriation acts in 56 developing countries between 1960 and 1995, only 59 occurred in democracies, and the level of democracy was negatively related to expropriation in a multivariate regression. Büthe and Milner ð2008Þ find that the division of political powers increases the inflow of FDI to developing countries, and Jensen ð2006Þ shows that target country democracy is associated with increased FDI inflows.
There are alternative arguments of the relationship between democracy and FDI. Li and Resnick ð2003Þ argue that democracies are more exposed to public demands for the redistribution of capital, to demands for improved labor practices, and to arguments by domestic competitors against advantageous competitive positions held by MNCs. They find that after controlling for the democratic protection of property rights, the residual effect of democracy is to reduce investment flows to developing countries. These arguments, however, apply specifically to developing countries, where poverty is highest and MNCs may be attracted by cheap labor and poorly regulated competition. The fact remains that most FDI inflows go to developed countries. Further, previous analyses of the influence of democracy on FDI may have suffered from misspecification, because they did not consider the simultaneous impact of IGO connections, which are more common between democratic countries.
If democracies do indeed provide better surety for FDI, then the role of IGOs as a source of surety would presumably be smaller, suggesting that target country democracy and IGO connectedness will be institutional substitutes. This leads us to test the following interaction hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3.-Connections in the IGO network will do less to increase FDI to target countries that are more democratic.
METHOD
We use gravity models to test our hypothesis. Gravity models, originally created to explain bilateral trade flows, "have produced some of the clearest and most robust empirical findings in economics" ðLeamer and Levinsohn 1995, p. 1384Þ. The widespread acceptance of gravity models in international economics has been reinforced by continuous efforts to link Equation ð1Þ represents a basic specification for a gravity model that explains FDI flows between countries i and j ðY ij Þ as a function of countryspecific variables ðX i and X j Þ, such as GDP or population, and dyadic variables ðX ij Þ, such as joint income, physical and cultural distance between country pairs, and so on:
where h ij is an error term assumed to be statistically independent of X i , X j , and X ij , and Eðh ij jX i X j X ij 5 1Þ. The standard practice is to log-linearize equation ð1Þ and estimate the coefficients b by ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ using the following equation:
However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro ð2006Þ raise two issues with this approach. First, it relies heavily on the assumption that h ij and lnðh ij Þ are statistically independent of the covariates, an assumption that is normally violated when error terms are heteroskedastic. 3 As a result, OLS estimates of equation ð2Þ would be inconsistent. Second, when the dependent variable is equal to zero, the log linearization is infeasible. This issue is especially important in our empirical context because only a small number of countries account for most of the FDI and zero flows are common among the remaining countries. 4 Although several methods are used to overcome this limitation, such as dropping the pairs in which the dependent variable equals zero, using lnðY ij 1 1Þ as the dependent variable instead of lnðY ij Þ, or using Tobit estimation, no method guarantees that the coefficients are properly estimated.
To address these problems, Santos Silva and Tenreyro ð2006Þ suggest a variation of the traditional gravity model that does not use a log transformation of the dependent variable. This model, estimated by Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood and using a robust covariance matrix instead of OLS, 5 produces consistent estimators even in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Following their approach, we estimate the following equation:
where i and j denote the countries in the dyad; t represents time; FDI ijt is the real value of the FDI flow from country i to country j in year t; BIT ijt is a binary variable equal to one if there is a bilateral investment treaty between i and j at time t; aid ijt is the net unilateral financial aid that country i gives to country j at time t; trade ijt the unilateral trade flow between countries i and j in year t; GDPcap it is the GDP per capita in real terms for country i in year t; GDPcap jt is the GDP per capita in real terms for country j in year t; GDP it is the GDP in real terms for country i in year t; GDP jt is the GDP in real terms for country j in year t; natural jt is natural resources exports as a percentage of GDP for country j in year t; debt jt is the percentage of total debt to GDP for country j in year t; emissions jt is carbon dioxide emissions measured as kilograms of CO 2 per U.S. dollar of GDP in country j in year t; democ jt is the sum of the democracy and autocracy ðreverse codedÞ scores ðtaken from the Polity IV DatabaseÞ of country j in year t; IGO ijt is IGO connectedness, the number of IGOs that countries i and j are simultaneously members of in year t; D ij is a set of fixed effects at the dyad level; and Y t is a set of year fixed effects. To examine hypothesis 2, we decompose the variable for IGO connectedness into two subcomponents: EIGO ijt is economic IGO connectedness, the number of economic IGOs that countries i and j are simultaneously members of in year t; and SCIGO ijt is social/cultural IGO connectedness, the number of social or cultural IGOs that countries i and j are simultaneously members of in year t.
We use dyad fixed effects to account for the dependence of observations in our data and to control for all static dyadic influence in FDI flows, such as distance between the two countries and whether they share a common language, border, religion, or colonial history. Similarly, we use year fixed effects to control for historical events that affect all dyads, such as global economic shocks, the opening of Eastern European markets, and technological changes. These two sets of fixed effects control for all influences on FDI flows except those that vary simultaneously across time and within a dyad.
DATA
Dependent variable.-We built our dependent variable-FDI flows for country i to country j at time t-in four steps. First, we started with the most comprehensive data set available in FDI flows from UNCTAD, 6 which provided data for 31,150 inflows and outflows for the period 1980-2000. Although this initial set covered 214 home countries and 212 host countries, most of the flows identified are associated to countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ðOECDÞ ð65%Þ; non-OECD flows account for 35% of the data and non-OECD to non-OECD account for 18%. Because non-OECD countries are more likely to have nondemocratic regimes, the bias toward OECD countries in our sample may cast doubts in our estimates. Our following steps aimed to boost the number of data points associated to non-OECD countries as a source or destination of FDI.
In a second step we collected information for another 29 countries-all non-OECD countries. Although these countries are not included in the electronic database because they do not follow the UNCTAD standards to report FDI data, they are available in country-specific UNCTAD reports. Whenever possible, we accessed FDI reports directly from the central bank documents of these countries to check the data reported to UNCTAD as well as to collect extra observations. This effort provided another 5,516 observations, 43% of which are non-OECD to non-OECD FDI flows. UNCTAD's data reported by OECD countries tend to aggregate figures by region when the FDI flows are small. Suspecting that OECD countries are likely to report more detailed data than what UNCTAD reported, we checked FDI inflows and outflows from OECD country statistics through sourceoecd.org and obtained the country-specific flows that were aggregated by region in the UNCTAD data set.
7 This third step added 17,298 OECD-non-OECD observations.
The previous steps taught us that we could use comparisons between aggregated and disaggregated values to impute nonreported FDI flows. The logic used in this process was the following: if the summation of all the reported dyads is equal to the aggregated values reported by IMF, then any missing dyadic flow should be zero. For example, if UNCTAD and OECD reported data for inflows to country A from countries A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 and the summation of these flows is equal to the total inflows to country A, then we can infer that inflows from countries A 4 to A n are equal to zero. This approach was useful to infer outflow data for non-OECD countries, which commonly report zero outflows at the macroeconomic level. Of course the validity of this approach depends on whether the data reported by central banks to IMF are correct. But short of collecting these data from primary sources, we think that this approach is the most comprehensive we can follow. This fourth step added 30,154 observations.
Panel A of table 1 shows the final distribution of the 84,478 inflows and outflows obtained through our four-step approach.
8 Steps 2-4 move the proportion between OECD and non-OECD from 65% versus 35% to 43% versus 57%. The increase in data points associated with non-OECD countries is capturing flows not only from OECD to non-OECD ð28% of observationsÞ but also from non-OECD to non-OECD ð29%Þ. Note that the sample has twice as many observations for non-OECD to non-OECD flows as for OECD to OECD flows.
Panel B of table 1 uses FDI value-measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars-instead of number of observations. As expected, even if the flows between OECD countries are small in terms of observation numbers, they represent a significant majority in terms of values: 79% of FDI flows correspond to flows among OECD country pairs and 81% of flows have an OECD country as the source or destination. OECD countries invest directly in non-OECD countries twice as much as other non-OECD countries. Although the number of observations decreases because of missing values for control variables for some country pairs, we believe that our sample offers a very comprehensive representation of FDI flows.
Some idiosyncrasies of the FDI data require further comment. If both countries in the dyad are in the data set, the same unidirectional FDI flow That is, the outflow figure from Canada to the United States may differ from the inflow figure to the United States from Canada because of differences in what each country defines as FDI. We dealt with the problem of duplicated flows in three ways: using their average, randomly choosing one of the reported flows as the actual flow, or using only inflow data.
10 Although all three approaches produce similar results, we use average flows in our main analysis and introduce the alternative approaches in robustness checks.
Another issue is the presence of negative FDI flows. A multinational firm may decide to close or reduce operations in a given country. If the number of firms doing so is high enough, the overall aggregate FDI flow may be negative. Unfortunately, negative values cannot be in Poisson models required to estimate equation ð3Þ. Thus we drop 4,832 observations. To explore whether these missing observations may induce selection bias, we perform the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing the two samples-missing observations and remaining observations-in four key independent variables: democracy levels, AIGOs, EIGOs, and SCIGOs. For all the tests, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that both samples are similar. Thus we do not expect that the exclusion of observations linked to negative flows affects our results.
Independent variables.-Our key independent variable, the IGO network, is built using the time-varying listing of IGOs and their members compiled by Pevehouse et al. ð2004Þ . According to their definition, an IGO must ð1Þ include three or more members of the Correlates of War-defined state system, ð2Þ hold regular plenary sessions at least once every 10 years, and ð3Þ possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters.
We first aggregate all IGOs ðAIGOsÞ regardless of their mandates. There were 402 of these that operated anytime in the period we studied ðBeckfield ½2010 lists the 335 that existed in 2000Þ. We then classified the IGOs into economic or social/cultural on the basis of their mandates as described in For AIGOs, EIGOs, and SCIGOs, we used the IGO member listing to create time-varying affiliation matrices of connectedness between two countries. The affiliation matrix for AIGOs at time t, A t , is produced by multiplying X t , a matrix whose cells indicate whether a country is a member of a given IGO at time t, by its transpose X T t . Thus, A t is a symmetric country-by-country matrix in which the cell a ijt indicates the number of AIGOs in which country i and country j share joint membership at time t, the measure we call AIGO connectedness. Similarly, E t is a symmetric country-by-country matrix in which the cell e ijt indicates the number of EIGOs in which country i and country j share joint membership at time t, the measure we call EIGO connectedness. Finally, the affiliation matrix for SCIGOs, S t , is created in the same way by multiplying Y t , a countryby-country SCIGO matrix whose cells indicate whether a country is a member of a given SCIGO at time t, by its transpose Y T t . Our EIGO and SCIGO measures are highly correlated ð.794Þ. To avoid multicollinearity problems-especially when the connectedness and democracy measures are interacted-we orthogonalized them.
12 Finally, we take the natural logarithms of the IGO connectedness variables for consistency with the treatment of other independent variables in the gravity model.
Control variables.-We tap different sources to obtain the other countrylevel variables used in our models. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, associated with the World Bank, provides the 11 The set of AIGOs includes two other categories of IGOs besides EIGOs and SCIGOs ðgeneral purpose and militaryÞ. We do not analyze networks created by these explicitly because of the multicollinearity problems created by analyzing four IGO networks simultaneously and because we have no particular predictions regarding them. Our results do not change if we exclude these from AIGOs in our aggregate network or include them with EIGOs in our decomposed networks. 12 We replicated our baseline regressions without orthogonalizing EIGO and SCIGO. Results, available on request from the authors, show larger but less statistically significant coefficients. Data for the democracy variable come from the Polity IV Database, a widely used data set in political science and international relations research. Democracy is the aggregate of two orthogonal 10-point subscales, one representing the presence of autocratic institutions in a state ðreverse codedÞ and the other the presence of democratic institutions. The original range, from 210 to 10, is transformed into a 1-21 scale to allow for the log transformation. Thus 21 is the maximum democratic score, with the value 1 capturing the most autocratic states.
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Unless otherwise indicated, the IGO independent variables in our analyses are lagged one year. Table 2 shows the summary statistics and correlation matrix for our variables.
RESULTS
Model 1 in table 3 contains our control variables. Model 2 adds the measure for connectedness through all IGOS, AIGO connectedness. Consistent with our fundamental assertion ðhypothesis 1Þ, the FDI flow from country i to country j is significantly greater as a function of the number of IGOs that they are jointly members in. The Poisson regression model is multiplicative, so the magnitude of the coefficient represents the impact of a change in AIGO connectedness on the ceteris paribus rate of FDI from i to j. The coefficient in model 2 indicates that a 1-SD increase in logged AIGO connectedness is associated with a 24% increase in FDI ðe 0:51Â0:485 5 1:24Þ. Model 3 adds the interaction between AIGO connectedness and the level of democracy of the target country. The interaction term has a negative coefficient as predicted by hypothesis 3, but it is only marginally significant ðP ≈ .07Þ. 13 We also estimated our models using POLCON, Henisz's ð2000Þ index of political constraint, rather than democracy to capture the support from domestic institutions for commitment to investors. Results were comparable to those we found using the democracy measure. We use democracy from Polity IV in this article because its greater coverage allows us to include substantially more dyads in the analysis. Subsequent models will show that the interaction with target democracy depends on the type of IGO connection.
Models 4-10 present decompositions of AIGO connectedness into that from EIGOs and SCIGOs.
14 Models 4 and 5 show that EIGO connectedness is associated with an increase in FDI flows, but the increase lessens as the democracy of the target country increases, as predicted by hypothesis 3. Given that our theory rests on a mechanism of relational governance rather than the direct power of particular IGOs, we wanted to show that our EIGO results were not driven by participation in the small set of prominent and powerful EIGOs that are popularly viewed as the most significant in the global economy.
15 These include the IMF and WTO, the only two IGOs that have been previously analyzed for their effect on FDI. To these two, we added the three IGOs associated with the World Bank. These five IGOs are called the "Bretton Woods" institutions. We calculated a dyadic connectedness variable using only connections through simultaneous membership in these five IGOs. Model 6 shows that while its coefficient is positive, it is not statistically significant. Model 7 replicates model 5 but excludes the IMF, WTO, and World Bank from the calculation of EIGO connectedness. In other words, EIGO connectedness in this model is based on connections through "all the rest" of the world's EIGOs that are less prominent and powerful. Nevertheless, the results are comparable to those in model 5. The effect of EIGOs we document is not driven by participation in the small set of powerful "brand-name" economic IGOs. 16 Model 8 shows that SCIGO connectedness has a positive influence on FDI flows, as predicted by hypothesis 2. Model 9 includes the interaction between SCIGO connectedness and target democracy and yields an unexpected result. Now the main effect of SCIGO connectedness is negative and 14 There are multiple ways to explore the heterogeneity of IGOs. The approach we follow, a dichotomous characterization of IGOs into economic and social, is appropriate to study the effect of overall connectedness on FDI. An alternative approach may be to look at other sources of IGO heterogeneity, such as size, age, sector, and organizational structure. Besides imposing extra data requirements, the latter approach also brings the issue of aggregation at the dyad level. For example, it is not clear how to aggregate organizational structures or age across IGOs. At the extreme, one could evaluate IGO by IGO controlling for all the other IGOs, but that approach assumes independence between IGO affiliations that is itself open to question. 15 One might argue that some IGOs increase FDI, some reduce it, and some have no effect. Although this scenario is inconsistent with the patterns we observed ðnegative and positive effects might be expected to cancel each other outÞ, it is possible that our results are driven by specific IGOs. If that is the case, these specific IGOs must have a wide membership given our comprehensive country coverage. EIGOs such as the World Bank and IMF fall into this category. 16 In terms of our theory of relational governance, there is nothing wrong with the Bretton Woods IGOs. We see them as offering opportunities to build dyadic relationships, much as other less prominent IGOs. the interaction is positive. Although the direction of the interaction was a surprise to us, the crossover point at which the combined main and interaction effects of SCIGO connectedness act to increase predicted FDI is at a target country democracy of six or higher. This includes 83% of our dyads, so there is consistent support for hypothesis 2, that SCIGO connectedness is associated with more FDI.
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Figure 1 uses coefficients from models 5 and 9 and plots the combined main and interaction effects of SCIGO and EIGO ties ðboth evaluated at their mean levelÞ over the range of target country democracy. The substitution effect predicted by hypothesis 3 between IGO connectedness and target democracy is apparent for EIGO connectedness, but SCIGO connectedness and target democracy appear to be complements. We will take up this unpredicted result in the discussion. Finally, in table 3, model 10 presents a full model that includes EIGO connectedness, SCIGO connectedness, and the interactions between each and target country democracy. The results are consistent with the nested models.
In table 4 we reproduce the specifications in table 3 using different approaches for reconciling the flow of FDI from country i to country j as re- 17 The fact that SCIGO ties at very low levels of target country democracy are associated with reductions in the expected level of FDI was surprising to us. It is not clear why an IGO tie would ever decrease the expected level of FDI. Supplementary analysis suggests that this outcome is attributable to the influence on our models of a small set of outlier observations. If we exclude observations for which the actual FDI is most in excess of our estimate ðthese observations are mostly associated with states in obviously unusual circumstances, such as Argentina during the hyperinflation periodÞ, we obtain estimated multiplier effects for SCIGO connectedness that go up from one.
FIG. 1.-Effect of IGO connectedness on FDI over the range of target democracy
ported by i and by j. ðRecall that in table 3 we took the average of duplicate reports.Þ In models 1-8 we choose randomly between duplicate reports, in models 9-16 we take only inflow data, and in models 17-24 we use a threeyear moving average of reported flows. In all cases results correspond to those in table 3 in all substantive ways.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
There are deep and reciprocal interdependencies between interstate economic and political relationships, so the issues of causality and endogeneity in our models deserve careful attention. To begin, we highlight that in the models we have so far shown, the independent variables are lagged one year, so there is no possibility of reverse causality in the simplest sense that our dependent variable causes the independent variable. In supplementary analyses we replicated our full model, model 10, using five-year lags of our IGO connectedness variables. All of the coefficients for EIGO connectedness, SCIGO connectedness, and their interactions with target country democracy were comparable whether IGO connectedness was lagged one or five years. This is consistent with our theoretical claims because the information, trust, and affect impact of an IGO connection would be expected to endure over time. The result further raises the bar for alternative explanations by demanding that they account for this lag.
A much bigger worry is that both FDI and IGO connectedness could be driven by some common cause that was not reflected in our model. Certainly, there are many dimensions of the dyadic relationship between states that affect both FDI and IGO connectedness, such as geographic proximity, language, a history of colonial relationships, and common religious or cultural heritage. All of these influences, however, are accounted for by the dyad fixed effects in our model, which represent all of the timeinvariant features of a dyad. Similarly, our year fixed effects account for global trends over time that might influence both FDI and IGO connectedness, such as technological changes that increase binational awareness and sympathy ðthe Internet and cheaper air travel come to mindÞ, shocks to the global system such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, or a diffuse cultural trend of globalization. Our fixed effects do not account for variables that change within a dyad over time, but many that seem very important as simultaneous influences on FDI and IGO connectedness are directly controlled for in our models: ð1Þ the existence of BITs, ð2Þ the flows of financial aid between countries in the dyad, ð3Þ the trade between the countries in a dyad, ð4Þ the wealth of the countries in a dyad, ð5Þ the existence of unique natural resources in the target country, ð6Þ the debt level of the target country, and ð7Þ the possibility that the target country is a paradise for a "polluting" type of investment. While we believe that the most likely common cause variables are accounted for in our model specification, there are other possibilities that our controls do not preclude.
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Additionally, we estimated models that offer target country fixed effects and target country time trends to capture time-varying omitted variables such as schooling and human capital.
19 Most statistical software packages use maximum likelihood estimation for Poisson panel data. Finding a maximum when there are numerous dummy variables that need to be estimated poses a challenge even to the best maximization algorithms. In most cases, our attempts to estimate models with a complete set of dummy variables failed to converge. As a result, we went back to OLS panel data, the standard method for estimating gravity equations until very recently, to estimate models with multiple dummy variable sets. Tables 5 and 6 show our results. Table 5 's objective is to link our Poisson results from table 3 to identical models estimated by OLS. Note that the behavior of the main variables is very similar between estimation techniques. Table 6 shows the results of introducing target country fixed effects ðmodels 1-8Þ and additional target country-specific time trend ðmodels 9-16Þ. Again our main results are robust to adding these sets of dummy variables.
Our results could also be caused spuriously by serial autocorrelation in our dependent variable, FDI flows, or in the EIGO and SCIGO connectedness variables. We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we ran a battery of tests to explore any sort of autocorrelation. Specifically, we applied four Fisher-type unit-root tests ðinverse chi-square, inverse normal, inverse logit, and modified inverse chi-squareÞ for these three variables with no evidence of serial autocorrelation. To provide more compelling evidence of a lack of nonstationary problems, we applied a Wooldridge test on the residuals for all models in table 3. The null hypothesis is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the error terms. The F-statistics for the models 18 In supplemental analysis we ran regressions that included a direct measure of timevarying cultural distance, created from the World Values Survey by Berry et al. ð2010Þ . We think that one of the influences of SCIGOs is to affect cultural convergence, but there are surely other forces that are driving convergence. If a direct measure of time-varying cultural distance knocked out our SCIGO effects, it would open a concern that exogenous forces of cultural convergence may be driving both SCIGO connectedness and FDI flows. Even though we lose 75% of our observations because of missing cultural distance data, in these regressions the sign and significance for the main and interaction effects of SCIGO connectedness were significant in the same directions, and the magnitudes were comparable to those in table 3. We also examined our belief that SCIGO connections promote cultural convergence by regressing cultural distance on lagged levels of SCIGO connectedness, controlling for dyad and year fixed effects. The results, available from the authors, support our belief that SCIGOs promote convergence. 19 We considered controlling for these variables directly. However, adding these variables would reduce our sample dramatically because of missing data. For example, migration flows are missing for 80% of dyads in our sample; schooling years in the target countries are missing for 91% of dyads. The gold standard to test causality is an experiment in which subjects are randomly assigned to two groups, those that receive a treatment and those that do not. The global political economy is hardly the domain where this approach can be taken. Rosenbaum and Rubin ð1983Þ introduced the idea of propensity score matching as a quasi-experimental approach to test causality. The idea is to create pairs of observations that are similar in many dimensions but differ in one attribute, the treatment. Propensity scores summarize all of the background ðcovariateÞ information about treatment selection into a scalar. This allows an observational study to be interpreted similarly to an experiment. While this approach is not a panacea to the problem of unobserved variables, it relaxes many assumptions about how variables affect the selection into treatment.
We follow this approach to provide a complementary test of causality in our setting. We begin with the main effect of connectedness through all IGOs. We created "treatment" groups from the top ðbottomÞ 10%, 25%, and 50% of observations on the AIGO connectedness measure. We then created "control" groups by selecting from the observations with lower ðhigherÞ IGO connectedness those that are most similar to those in the treatment group in terms of other variables. We then compared the average FDI over the next three years. As table 7 shows, in every case, the group with higher AIGO connectedness experienced more subsequent FDI than its less connected match group.
We next applied the propensity score approach to look at EIGO and SCIGO connectedness while also observing shocks to the target country's political system to gain further insight into causality. Dyads were assigned to the high EIGO connectedness treatment if they were in the top 5% of the distribution for that variable. Similarly, dyads were assigned to the high SCIGO connectedness treatment if their level was in the top 5% of that distribution. Then we looked at a shock in the democracy level. Two types of shocks may occur: a country becomes suddenly more democratic ðe.g., a dictator is deposedÞ or more authoritarian ðe.g., a coup d'état occursÞ. We identified shocks as the largest 1% of year-to-year changes in a target democracy. These shocks represent substantial changes in democracy. For negative shocks there was a decrease of 3-15 points on the 21-point scale; on the positive side, the size of the largest changes ranged from 9 to 16 points.
We used all the control variables from model 1 to find the matches for scenarios of positive and negative democracy shocks. For example, each observation with high levels of EIGO connectedness was matched with another observation that had experienced the same shock and was similar to the treated observation in all control variables. In other words, for each observation that had been treated, the algorithm obtained at least one observation that was similar in each dimension but that had not been treated ðe.g., it did not have high levels of EIGOsÞ. Note that this observation corresponds to a dyad with the same target country but a different source country. For example, if a negative democratic shock occurs in Argentina and the United Kingdom has strong EIGO connectedness with Argentina, the algorithm picks another country that invested in Argentina, is very similar to the United Kingdom in the dimensions defined by the control variables, and does not have high levels of EIGO connectedness to Argentina. After the match proceeds and the propensity scores are calculated, a test on the mean of change in FDI is conducted between the treatment and control groups. If a statistical difference is found, then a stronger link of causality between the treatment and the output can be inferred. Table 8 shows the results of this analysis. Our output variable is the change of FDI flows for one and three years after the shock. The results of this pseudo experiment are in line with those of our multivariate regressions. Our multivariate regressions showed that EIGO connectedness was associated with more FDI when democracy is low, and the propensity score analysis shows that the EIGO treatment is associated with more FDI for negative shocks in democracy. Our multivariate regressions showed that SCIGO connectedness was associated with more FDI when democracy is high, and the propensity score analysis shows that the SCIGO treatment is associated with more FDI for positive shocks in democracy.
After all these robustness checks-lagged independent variables, a complete list of variables that cover potential alternative explanations, an extended set of dummy variables to control for host country unobservables and time trends, corrections for serial autocorrelation, and a quasi-experimental test through propensity scores-it is worth highlighting just what an alternative explanation would have to account for in our results. It is not sufficient merely to account for a positive association between IGO connectedness and FDI; our theory also predicts, and our results show, a negative interaction between IGO connectedness and target country democracy. A credible alternative explanation would also have to account for this interaction. Furthermore, our results show very different effects of EIGO and SCIGO connectedness as target country democracy increases. Although we had not predicted this a priori, we will explain in the discussion that these findings are consistent with our position that EIGO and SCIGO connectedness represent very different mechanisms of governance. After our robustness checks, the set of alternative explanations that might account for this complex, but theoretically consistent, pattern of IGO connectedness effects is vanishingly small. Add to this some important facts about the processes that bring about IGO connectedness and FDI. First, different agents are responsible for these two outcomes: states engage in IGOs whereas companies engage in FDI. Thus, alternatives must explain the mobilization of these two agents and cannot rely only on the initiative of states or that of companies. Furthermore, IGO connectedness is not easily focused on a single dyadic relationship: when a country joins an IGO, it adds a connection with at least two countries, and typically many more. This frustrates alternatives that derive from purely dyadic mechanisms. Altogether, the hurdles for alternative explanations to the causal logic we present loom very large.
DISCUSSION
The insufficiency of state authority as a source of surety for transactions that transcend national borders creates an opportunity for an increased role for other governance forms. In this article, we applied a network methodology to show that relational governance through IGO connections facilitates FDI. We further document a fascinating interdependence between domestic institutions, specifically democracy, and the international institutions represented by IGOs. The results help to understand which countries attract FDI and from which senders.
We see normative mechanisms behind IGO influence. This suggests a very different approach from past research of the effect of IGOs on FDI, which has taken a monadic approach focused on the most powerful IGOs. Instead, we examine dyadic ties in an affiliation network created by the set of hundreds of extant IGOs, most of them weak and incapable of controlling the states that are their members through coercion. The number of connections in this network between two countries has a substantial positive influ-ence on the flow of FDI between them, and the results do not change if we exclude the IMF, WTO, and World Bank when constructing the network.
Yet more evidence that IGOs enable relational governance comes from the fact that it is not only economic IGO connectedness but also social or cultural IGO connectedness that increases FDI flows between two countries. The influence of SCIGO connectedness reinforces arguments that social and cultural differences are a major barrier to cross-border investment and therefore to global economic integration. More optimistically, the result also suggests that IGOs are a mechanism for reducing social/cultural differences ðBonikowski 2010Þ and for reducing the negative effect of those differences on FDI. Future research should investigate the influence of IGOs, particularly SCIGOs, on all of the forms of distance identified by Berry et al. ð2006Þ .
For governance, this result highlights the role the social mechanisms can play in smoothing even the most high-stakes economic exchanges. Sociologists have long argued that socially embedded sentiments, such as trust, empathy, and affinity, all support exchange ðe.g., Granovetter 1985Þ. Nevertheless, unambiguous evidence in support of that claim is scarce, mostly because important and ongoing exchange relations often co-occur with social relations, making it difficult to isolate the benefit of social governance ðUzzi 1996; Gibbons 1999Þ. The distinction between economic and social/ cultural IGOs provides a rare opportunity to compare economic and social governance mechanisms.
As Stiglitz ð2003Þ and others have observed, international institutions do notably less to encourage FDI flows to some countries. Our results suggest at least two reasons why the flow of FDI is so unequal. First, the pattern of IGO connectedness is unequal ðBeckfield 2010Þ. IGO connections are strongest within regions and weaker between developed and developing countries, where FDI flows are also low.
Second, our findings regarding target country democracy may also be relevant for understanding which countries attract more or less FDI. When the target country is more democratic, EIGO connections do less to increase FDI flows. As Martin ð1999Þ argues, whether the international institutions substitute for or complement domestic institutions informs regarding the mechanisms through which they operate. We think that the substitution between democracy and EIGO connectedness occurs because they are two different mechanisms that provide surety to MNCs about their investments. When one is higher, the role of surety for the other is less important for FDI. We recognize that both EIGO connectedness and target democracy have other implications for FDI than the provision of surety. EIGO connectedness may represent opportunities for coordination. Target democracy may represent demands for redistribution and other policy changes relevant to MNCs, which may make some EIGOs less effective. For example, Shandra et al. ð2003Þ show that IMF conditionality does more to attract FDI for re-pressive regimes that can overwhelm civil resistance to IMF conditions. While that effect is consistent with our results, it seems relevant to only a few powerful EIGOs, not the large number of weak ones that drive our findings.
Target democracy interacts in the opposite way with SCIGO connectedness, to increase the flow of FDI, an effect that surely derives from the unique governance mechanisms embedded in networks of social/cultural, as opposed to economic, relations. One explanation for this is that the sources of FDI are overwhelmingly the "first-world" democratic countries. The social/ cultural connections of these sender countries to potential targets may be more effective if those targets are more democratic because of an international equivalent to interpersonal homophily. When a SCIGO brings the citizens of two democracies together, political similarity may enhance trust, smooth communication, and facilitate relationship building. Another explanation is that nondemocratic targets may not get as much out of SCIGO connections because they are less open and therefore less willing to exploit to the fullest opportunities for social and cultural contact. Consider for example the stereotype that the contingents from Eastern Bloc countries at international events during the Cold War were heavily guarded, constrained, and otherwise inhibited. Either way, the result indicates that for states as for individuals, employing social governance requires a certain capacity for sociability-the ability to strike up and maintain social relationships with others that are sufficiently positive that they may be the basis of trust, empathy, and affect.
Another implication of this concerns the interdependence between institutional forms. Although states form and operate IGOs, the relational mechanisms IGOs influence through are very different from the legitimate authority for coercion that states enjoy domestically. One characterization of the interdependence between these mechanisms is as a contest, with international organizations winning, affecting what Strange ð1996Þ has called a retreat of the state. Our results are consistent with this as they show a substitution effect between states and IGOs, at least for the EIGOs that are explicitly targeted at governing global economic transactions. On the other hand, it could be argued that the mere fact that target democracy affects FDI at all signals a victory for the relevance for global transactions of the state's domestic governance. Even more significant is that there is a positive interdependence between SCIGOs and target democracy, a relationship that is largely unforeseen in a literature that has highlighted rivalry between international organizations and states and attended more to the influence of EIGOs such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO than on SCIGOs, which rely on very different governance mechanisms.
The resulting conclusion must be that the interrelationship between domestic and international governance is more complex than previous accounts have recognized. And while our findings may give hope to those who see a substantial role for the state as economic globalization progresses, there can be no claim that the network forged by international organizations is not massively and increasingly important in this regard. We have argued that intergovernmental networks bridge an institutional abyss, by forging relationships that span country borders. The evidence supports this argument: the connections between states through both economic and social/cultural IGOs weigh positively and heavily on which states receive FDI from which others.
